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THE ANTI-INJUNCTION ACT, CONGRESSIONAL
INACTIVITY, AND PRE-ENFORCEMENT CHALLENGES
TO § 5000A OF THE TAX CODE
Kevin C. Walsh *
Section 5000A of the Tax Code is one of the most controversial
provisions of federal law currently on the books. It is the mini-
mum essential coverage provision of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act ("ACA" or "Act")-a provision more popularly
known as the individual mandate.' Opponents challenged this
provision immediately upon its enactment on March 23, 2010.2
The Supreme Court is poised to hear arguments about its consti-
tutionality in one of these challenges, just over two years later.
There is a puzzle surrounding the Supreme Court's considera-
tion of these cases. Everyone seems to want an answer to the
question of whether § 5000A is constitutional. And, at this point,
everyone seems to want an answer as soon as possible. But there
* Assistant Professor, University of Richmond School of Law. J.D., 2002, Harvard
Law School; M.A., 1999, University of Notre Dame; A.B., 1998, Dartmouth College.
Thank you to all who contributed to the "Everything But the Merits" 2011 Allen Chair
Symposium, particularly organizer-extraordinaire Aminah Qureshi (University of Rich-
mond School of Law Class of 2012), Dean Wendy Perdue, Carl Tobias, and the participants
in the Symposium. Thank you, as well, to Keith Fogg, Steve Johnson, and Neil Siegel for
helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper, and to Christopher Dadak, Timothy
Dustan, and Sam Irvin for superb research assistance.
1. See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (Supp. IV 2010). On the terminological point, see, for exam-
ple, Nicholas Bagley & Jill R. Horwitz, Commentary, Why It's Called the Affordable Care
Act, 110 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 1 (2011), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/as
sets/fi/110/bagleyhorwitz.pdf (describing § 5000A as "titled 'Maintenance of Minimum Es-
sential Coverage,' but better known as the 'individual mandate"').
2. See, e.g., Kevin C. Walsh, The Ghost that Slayed the Mandate, 64 STAN. L. REV. 55,
56 n.3 (2012) (noting that Virginia filed a challenge to the individual mandate "minutes
after President Obama signed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act into law");
id. at 59 n.17 ("In addition to Virginia, many others also filed suit, including a collection of
several states led by Florida, along with a smattering of private individuals and organiza-
tions.").
3. See Granted & Noted List-October Term 2011, SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S. (Jan.
11, 2012), http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/11grantednotedlist.pdf (noting the cases
involving the ACA for which the Court will hear oral arguments in March 2012).
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is a serious potential problem with the Supreme Court giving the
ruling that everyone seems to want. A federal statute known as
the Anti-Injunction Act ("AIA") prohibits pre-enforcement chal-
lenges to certain exactions that are administered through the
machinery of tax enforcement. There are strong arguments that
the AIA blocks the current challenges to § 5000A.' If the AIA
does, in fact, block these challenges, then no authoritative answer
to the question of § 5000A's constitutionality can be provided un-
til 2015 at the earliest.' The AIA is a rule that Congress made.
And it is not too late for Congress to make an exception to that
rule. The puzzle, then, is this: If there is a congressionally created
obstacle to getting a ruling that everyone in Congress seems to
want, and Congress can remove that obstacle, then why has it not
done so?
In this "Everything But the Merits" Allen Chair Symposium
contribution, I address this puzzle in three ways. First, I consider
various explanations for the failure of Congress, thus far, to enact
an exception to the AIA that would allow pre-enforcement chal-
lenges to § 5000A. I conclude that the best explanation is a damp-
ening of legislative initiative that results from the litigation posi-
tions of those who are best situated to appreciate the need for an
exception to the AIA. Second, I set forth a simple textual argu-
ment for why the AIA does bar the Supreme Court's consideration
of the currently pending challenges of § 5000A. The point is not to
present an exhaustive analysis. That will be supplied in the liti-
gation, and the Supreme Court will provide an authoritative an-
swer. The point is to present, in a concise manner, one of the
principal reasons why the authoritative answer that the Supreme
4. See 26 U.S.C. § 7421 (2006) (prohibiting lawsuits that seek to restrain the assess-
ment or collection of taxes); Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, No. 10-2347, _ F.3d _,
2011 WL 3962915, at *5 (4th Cir. 2011) (explaining that "the AIA prohibits a pre-
enforcement challenge to any 'exaction [that] is made under color of their offices by reve-
nue officers charged with the general authority to assess and collect the revenue"' (altera-
tion in original) (quoting Phillips v. Comm'r, 283 U.S. 589, 596 (1931))). A provision of the
Declaratory Judgment Act also blocks pre-enforcement challenges that seek declaratory
relief "with respect to Federal taxes." See 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2006). The precise scope of
this bar is unclear, but it is at least as broad as the bar imposed by the AIA. See Bob Jones
Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 732 n.7 (1974).
5. See generally Liberty Univ., Inc., No. 10-2347, _ F.3d at -, 2011 WL 3962915,
at *15-16; Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 21-22 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dis-
senting).
6. See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a), (b) (Supp. IV 2010) (providing that the minimum essen-
tial coverage requirement goes into effect in 2014, and that the penalty for noncompliance
is payable with the filing of individual tax returns due the following year).
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Court very well may provide-should Congress fail to enact an
exception-is that the AIA blocks the currently pending pre-
enforcement challenges to § 5000A. Third, I address one of the
principal gambits that the challengers have used to get around
the AIA-decoupling two judicially inseparable requirements in
§ 5000A: (1) the requirement to have insurance and (2) the penal-
ty that enforces it. Trying to pull these parts of § 5000A apart is a
peculiar move that raises questions about the appropriate unit of
analysis in pre-enforcement adjudication. On the one hand, the
challengers argue that the minimum coverage provision cannot
be severed and that the entire ACA must be rendered unenforce-
able if the minimum coverage provision is unconstitutional. On
the other hand, the challengers argue that they can challenge the
requirement to have insurance in § 5000A without necessarily
calling into question the enforceability of the tax penalty in the
very same section. These claims are not only inconsistent with
each other but also with a proper understanding of the federal ju-
dicial function of resolving cases and controversies.
I. WHY HAS CONGRESS LARGELY IGNORED THE AIA OBSTACLE?
The puzzle this piece addresses is why Congress has not acted
to lift a congressionally created obstacle to obtaining a ruling that
everyone in Congress apparently wants. One answer to this puz-
zle is to challenge the premise. Maybe it is not the case that eve-
ryone in Congress wants a prompt ruling on the constitutionality
of § 5000A.
If this premise is false, it would seem to be false because of the
Democrats, not the Republicans, who have largely been driving
the litigation.! As for the Democrats, the idea of putting off a rul-
7. See Jennifer Haberkorn & Scott Wong, Health Ruling Is GOP Rallying Cry,
POLITICO (Dec. 13, 2010, 3:08 PM), http://www.politico.cominews/stories/1210/46319.html.
("Lawmakers pounced on the news Monday that a federal judge has struck down health
reform's individual mandate-with Republicans welcoming it as a body blow to 'Obamac-
are' and Democrats dubbing it a detour on the road to reform."). In February 2011, twenty-
eight Republican governors sent a letter to President Obama encouraging the Administra-
tion to "support an expedited appellate process for each of the pending cases to achieve
quick resolution by the United States Supreme Court." Letter from Governors to President
Barack Obama (Feb. 9, 2011). In December 2011, Republican Congressman Leonard Lance
introduced the "Americans Need a Health Care Ruling Act" to ensure that the AIA does
not block Supreme Court consideration of the current pre-enforcement challenges. See
Leonard Lance, America Needs a Health Care Ruling, THE HILL (Dec. 5, 2011, 3:10 PM),
http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/healthcare/197265-america-needs-a-healthcare-
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ing on the constitutionality of § 5000A would have been more at-
tractive earlier on in the litigation. But now that the challenges
have successfully cast a cloud over the constitutionality of a cen-
tral provision of President Obama's signature legislative
achievement, the Democrats appear to have more to gain than to
lose in obtaining a prompt ruling.'
That appears to be the view of the Obama Administration,
which sought and obtained review of the single court of appeals
decision holding § 5000A unconstitutional.9 The Administration
could have attempted to delay the process by seeking en banc re-
view, but did not."o Instead, the Administration filed some of its
briefs early to move the Supreme Court's consideration along.'
ruling.
8. Democrats have understandably been less insistent than the Republicans on the
need for judicial consideration of the constitutionality of § 5000A. Nevertheless, there are
indications that some Senate Democrats favor a ruling sooner rather than later. In Febru-
ary 2011, Democratic Senator Bill Nelson sought to introduce a non-binding resolution
urging the Supreme Court to decide quickly whether § 5000A is constitutional. See Ted
Barrett, Senator Seeks Expedited Supreme Court Review of Health Care Law,
CNNPOLITICS (Feb. 2. 2011, 5:32 PM), http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2011/02/02/sena
tor-seeks-expedited-supreme-court-review-of-health-care-law/. In September 2011, Demo-
cratic Senator Mark Warner stated with respect to the challenges to the ACA that "[t]his
is going to end up getting decided by the Supreme Court and candidly, I hope, the sooner
the better." Kevin C. Walsh, Congress Can and Should Enact a Statutory Fix for the Tax
Anti-Injunction Act Defect in the Private-Party Constitutional Challenge to the Individual
Mandate, WALSHSLAW (Sept. 9, 2011), http://walshslaw.wordpress.com/2011/09/09/cong
ress-can-and-should-enact-a-statutory-fix-for-the-tax-anti-injunction-act-defect-in-the-priv
ate-party-constitutional-challenges-to-the-individual-mandate/ (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Ryan Nobles, Appeals Court Dismisses Virginia Health Care Challenge,
NBC12 (Sept. 8, 2011, 6:13 PM), http://www.nbcl2.com/story/15419494/federal-court-toss
es-lawsuit-over-health-reform.
9. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Flori-
da, 565 U.S. - (Sept. 27, 2011) (No. 11-398); see also Order Granting Certiorari, U.S.
Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 565 U.S. - (Nov. 14, 2011) No. 11-398; Flori-
da ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1330
(11th Cir. 2011).
10. See Lyle Denniston, Key Health Case Moves on Faster Track, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept.
26, 2011, 4:43 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/09/key-health-case-moves-to-faster-
track ("The Obama Administration, opting not to try to slow down the pace of a major case
on the constitutionality of the new health care law, passed up a chance Monday to get the
Eleventh Circuit Court to reconsider its decision August 12 nullifying the law's most cru-
cial provision.").
11. Lyle Denniston, U.S., States Push for Health Care Review (FURTHER
UPDATED), SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 18, 2011, 6:50 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/10/
u-s-spells-out-health-care-review-aim/ (explaining that the federal government filed early
responses, adding "further to the likelihood that the Court could act in ample time to re-
view the constitutional controversy in its current Term").
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This attempt to ensure Supreme Court review is consistent
with the Obama Administration's change of position on the AIA
itself. In all of the first-wave cases challenging the minimum cov-
erage provision, the federal government argued, in its motions to
dismiss, that the AIA barred pre-enforcement suits seeking to en-
join the operation of § 5000A. Not all of the district courts ad-
dressed the issue, as some dismissed for lack of standing, and be-
fore one district court was able to rule on the issue, the federal
government changed its position on the AIA." But every district
court that did reach this issue rejected the government's argu-
ment and held that the AIA did not prevent a pre-enforcement
challenge to § 5000A." In a clear strategy shift that corresponded
with the appellate phase of the § 5000A litigation, the federal
government switched course and no longer asserted that pre-
enforcement challenges to § 5000A were barred by the AIA.14 The
most extensive articulation of the federal government's new posi-
tion came in a supplemental brief filed at the request of the
12. See Mead v. Holder, 766 F. Supp. 2d 16, 18 n.1 (D.D.C. 2011) (noting the federal
government argued in an August 2010 motion to dismiss that the AIA barred the action,
but the government then filed a notice on January 21, 2011 indicating that it no longer
sought to press that argument); Bryant v. Holder, No. 2:10 CV 76 KS MTP, 2011 WL
710693, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 3, 2011) (dismissing on standing grounds after noting the
federal government had pressed but later withdrew an argument for dismissal based on
the AIA); N.J. Physicians, Inc. v. Obama, 757 F. Supp. 2d 502, 511 n.2 (D.N.J. 2010) ("Be-
cause the Court finds that Plaintiffs have no standing to challenge the Act, it declines to
address the issue of whether Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the Anti-Injunction Clause,
26 U.S.C. § 7421(a)."); Baldwin v. Sebelius, No. 10CV1033 DMS (WMC), 2010 WL
3418436, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2010) (declining to reach the AIA as a ground for dis-
missal upon concluding that plaintiffs lacked standing).
13. See Goudy-Bachman v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 764 F. Supp. 2d
684, 694-97 (M.D. Pa. 2011) (holding that the AIA did not bar a challenge to § 5000A);
Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 753 F. Supp. 2d 611, 627-29 (W.D. Va. 2010) (same); U.S.
Citizens Ass'n v. Sebelius, 754 F. Supp. 2d 903, 909 (N.D. Ohio 2010) (same); Florida ex
rel. Bill McCollum v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1141-42
(N.D. Fla. 2010) (same); Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882, 890-91
(E.D. Mich. 2010) (same); Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598, 603-
05 (E.D. Va. 2010) (same).
14. See Brief for Appellant at 6 n.1, Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d
253 (4th Cir. 2011) (Nos. 11-1057 & 11-1058) (noting that the federal government does not
challenge the district court's decision that the AIA poses no bar); Brief for Appellees at 5
n.1, Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, - F.3d - (4th Cir. 2011) (No. 10-2347), 2011 WL
3962915 (same); Brief for Appellees at 5 n.1, Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d
529 (6th Cir. 2011) (No. 10-2388) (same). The federal government's briefs in the Eleventh
and D.C. Circuits include no mention of the AIA. See Brief for Appellants, Florida ex rel.
Attorney Gen. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011)
(Nos. 11-11021 & 11-11067); Brief for Appellees, Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1 (D.C.
Cir. 2011) (No. 11-5047).
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Fourth Circuit." That filing acknowledged that the AIA is juris-
dictional and that the federal government initially argued for
dismissal under the AIA in the district courts.16 But "[o]n further
reflection, and on consideration of the decisions rendered thus far
in the ACA litigation, the United States has concluded that the
AIA does not foreclose the exercise of jurisdiction in these cases.""
Perhaps the Administration's public positions on the timing of
Supreme Court review and the applicability of the AIA diverges
from its private strategy. That is, perhaps the Administration
still prefers delayed review-which would allow the law to be-
come more entrenched and more difficult for the judiciary to up-
root-but the Administration cannot state this position publicly
because it would be too politically costly. Doing so would portray
weakness and uncertainty, as the position is premised on the be-
lief that prompt review could result in invalidation.
If the Obama Administration is, in fact, pursuing a two-track,
public/private strategy, it very well could work. Even though none
of the parties to the § 5000A litigation now asserts that the AIA
bars the litigation, the Supreme Court must address the issue.
That is because the AIA is jurisdictional, and federal courts have
an obligation to ensure that they have jurisdiction before they
rule on an issue.' Accordingly, the Supreme Court has appointed
an amicus curiae, Washington, D.C. lawyer Robert Long, to argue
the position that the AIA bars the challenges to § 5000A that are
pending at the Supreme Court.
15. See Supplemental Brief for Appellees at 1-2, Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner,
F.3d - (4th Cir. May 31, 2011) (No. 10-2347), 2011 WL 3962915.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 2.
18. See Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 5 (1962) (stating
that "[t]he object of [the AIA] is to withdraw jurisdiction from the state and federal
courts"). Some have argued that the AIA is not jurisdictional. See, e.g., Patrick J. Smith, Is
the Anti-Injunction Act Jurisdictional?, 133 TAX NOTES 1093, 1104 (Nov. 28, 2011). While
a full defense of the AIA's jurisdictionality is beyond the scope of this Symposium contri-
bution, suffice it to say that the text of the statute easily satisfies the test for a jurisdic-
tional bar. The statutory command that "no suit [of a certain kind] .... shall be maintained
in any court," 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (2006), clearly governs a court's "adjudicatory capacity,"
Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202 (2011).
19. Order Inviting Robert Long as Amicus Curiae, 565 U.S. - (Nov. 18, 2011) ("Rob-
ert A. Long, Esquire, of Washington, D.C., is invited to brief and argue this case, as ami-
cus curiae, in support of the position that the [AIA], 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a), bars the suit
brought by respondents to challenge the minimum coverage provision of the [ACA], 26
U.S.C. § 5000A.").
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Because it very well could succeed and because one can think of
plausible reasons for the Administration to want to delay review,
this explanation of a dual public/private strategy cannot be ruled
out entirely. But I do not think it is a persuasive explanation.
One should not attribute a secret motive when the reasons for
prompt review outweigh the reasons for delayed review-as it
seems the Administration and congressional Democrats both do
believe and ought to believe.
The principal reason for the Obama Administration and con-
gressional Democrats to favor prompt review is to lift the consti-
tutional cloud hanging over the health care legislation. Attaining
that objective obviously depends upon winning on the constitu-
tional merits. But the Obama Administration could reasonably
conclude that its likelihood of success on the merits renders the
prospect of a prompt ruling an improvement on a status quo in
which a cloud lingers over the Administration's most significant
legislative achievement.
Another reason for the Obama Administration and congres-
sional Democrats to favor prompt review is that the uncertainty
generated by the litigation-which will last until the Supreme
Court rules authoritatively-negatively affects important con-
stituencies. The agencies and officials responsible for the ongoing
implementation of this massive Act have an obvious interest in
removing the litigation overhang from the implementation pro-
cess. And the private sector, of course, has very strong interests
in reducing uncertainty. In designing the legislation, and in craft-
ing litigation positions, the Obama Administration has seemingly
been responsive to the concerns of the health insurance industry
in particular. The Administration's responsiveness to health in-
surers' concerns is evident in its litigation position that § 5000A
is not severable from the guaranteed-issue and the community-
ratings provisions.2 0 It would be consistent with this litigation po-
sition for the Administration to favor prompt review notwith-
standing the potential for an unfavorable outcome. Health insur-
20. See Consolidated Brief for Respondents at 10, Florida v. U.S. Dep't of Health &
Human Servs., Nos. 11-393 & 11-400 (U.S. 2011) (arguing that the Eleventh Circuit erred
"in holding that the guaranteed-issue and community-rating provisions that will take ef-
fect in 2014 can be severed from the minimum coverage provision").
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ers are in limbo right now, and their only way out is to attain
clarity on § 5000A and related provisions.2 1
In sum, there are enough reasons to take the Obama Admin-
istration at its word that it is worthwhile to look elsewhere for a
better explanation for the failure to address the AIA as an obsta-
cle to pre-2015 review of the constitutionality of § 5000A.
The next explanation to consider is that there really is no AIA
obstacle. That is, the concerns that some have expressed about
the AIA amount to much ado about nothing." This perception
that nothing in the AIA would block prompt review is probably
part of the explanation for congressional inaction. But this expla-
nation invites the further question of whether the perception is
accurate.
The course of the litigation in the courts of appeals suggests
that the question whether the AIA bars pre-enforcement review
to § 5000A is at least a close one. Three court of appeals judges
have determined that the AIA does bar pre-enforcement chal-
lenges." It is, of course, possible that these judges are wrong. Af-
ter all, they were in the minority among the federal appellate
judges to have addressed the issue.24 But counting noses of lower-
21. See Brief of Am.'s Health Ins. Plans as Amicus Curiae in Partial Support of Certi-
orari Review at 24, Florida v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Nos. 11-393, 11-398 &
11-400 (U.S. 2011) (arguing that the Supreme Court should consider the question of sev-
erability immediately upon resolving the constitutional merits, so that "any resolution of
the constitutional challenge to the individual mandate this Term [will] offer a viable
measure of certainty and closure to these debates, rather than perpetuate business insta-
bility and confusion for both member companies and their customers").
22. See, e.g., Laura Green, Court Anticlimax on Health Law?, PALM BEACH POST, Jan.
2, 2012, at Al (quoting two law professors in support of the proposition that the AIA ques-
tion is nothing more than "a housekeeping matter the court will dispatch before address-
ing the question of whether the federal government can require nearly every American to
buy health insurance").
23. See Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, No. 10-2347, _ F.3d _, 2011 WL 3962915,
at *1, *16, *23, *52 (4th Cir. Sept. 8, 2011) (2-1 decision holding that the AIA blocked a
pre-enforcement challenge to § 5000A); see also Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 4, 12, 21,
54 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (2-1 decision in which the dissenting judge argued that the AIA blocked
a pre-enforcement challenge to § 5000A).
24. Six judges determined that the AIA does not bar pre-enforcement challenges to
§ 5000A, and another three apparently thought that the issue was not even worth address-
ing. See Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 4, 12, 21, 54 (2-1 decision holding that the AIA posed no
obstacle to plaintiffs' challenge to § 5000A); Liberty Univ., Inc., _ F.3d _, 2011 WL
3962915, at *1, *16, *23, *52 (2-1 decision dismissing under the AIA over dissenting
judge's argument that the AIA did not bar the challenge); Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen. v.
U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1328 (11th Cir. 2011) (2-1 decision
holding § 5000A unconstitutional, but not addressing the AIA in either the majority or
dissenting opinions); Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 539-40 (6th Cir.
[Vol. 46:823830
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courts is hardly a definitive approach to predicting what the Su-
preme Court will do. Instead, one must engage in legal analysis
and assess what kinds of arguments the Supreme Court Justices
are likely to find most persuasive.
The next section sets forth one straightforward argument for
the AIA's applicability that may appeal to a majority of the Jus-
tices on the current Supreme Court. This argument is one of
many advanced by Judge Kavanaugh of the D.C. Circuit, and I
find it persuasive, although I recognize that its rejection by Judge
Silberman and Judge Edwards reveals that my assessment is far
from universally shared. 5 I leave it to the reader to judge, noting
here only that the argument does not depend on whether one
characterizes the penalty in § 5000A as a tax.
Other academic assessors of the AIA's applicability share the
view that the potential AIA obstacle to pre-enforcement adjudica-
tion is serious enough to warrant legislation. Professor Steve
Johnson, a tax law professor and opponent of § 5000A, has writ-
ten that the "question is close enough that a genuine chance ex-
ists" that the Supreme Court would conclude that the AIA blocks
a pre-enforcement challenge to § 5000A.2 6 Johnson asserts that
the AIA should not be interpreted to block such a pre-
enforcement challenge, but he believes that the chance the Su-
preme Court could decide that it does is "over 33 percent but un-
der 50 percent."" Johnson argues that "given the magnitude of
the potential harms," legislation to avoid application of the AIA
"would be a wise precaution even at a 20 percent or 10 percent
level of probability.""
2011) (holding that the AIA does not block a pre-enforcement challenge to § 5000A).
25. See Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 4, 12, 21, 54. The principal reason for focusing on the
argument discussed in the next section is its simplicity. Other persuasive arguments exist
for the AIA's applicability that rely on more detailed knowledge of prior case law interpret-
ing the AIA. For example, the basic line of argument advanced by Judge Motz and accept-
ed by Judge Wynn but rejected by Judge Davis in Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, _ F.3d
at , 2011 WL 3962915, at *1, *16, *22-23, *52, is persuasive, in my view. It is, however,
beyond the scope of this Symposium contribution to provide a full defense of this assess-
ment.
26. Steve R. Johnson, The Anti-Injunction Act and the Individual Mandate, 133 TAX
NOTES 1395, 1400, (Dec. 12, 2011).
27. Id. at 1400 n.62.
28. Id. at 1404 n.82.
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Michael Dorf and Neil Siegel, constitutional law professors and
supporters of § 5000A, have written in a similar vein.2 ' They offer
a novel reading of the AlA to circumvent the problem it might
otherwise pose for pre-enforcement challenges to § 5000A. But
they acknowledge that they are unsure of "the likelihood that five
Justices will be persuaded . . . to reach the merits."" Dorf and
Siegel state that a majority of the current Supreme Court "could
well be persuaded by the arguments advanced for the conclusion
that the relevant statutory texts are best read to bar the current
suits."" Accordingly, they recommend that Congress "pass a spe-
cial-purpose statute" to lift the potential AIA bar to pre-
enforcement adjudication of the constitutionality of § 5000A."
They write that "[t]he time for Congress and the Obama Admin-
istration to act is now.
It is noteworthy that Professors Johnson, Dorf, and Siegel all
advocate a legislated exception to the AIA even while arguing
that the best reading of the ALA does not block a pre-enforcement
challenge to § 5000A. They do so because they recognize both that
there are creditable (if not compelling) arguments that the AIA
does bar such a challenge, and also that there are significant
negative consequences to the Supreme Court reaching such a
conclusion. These professors differ in their views about the consti-
tutionality of § 5000A, but agree that the Supreme Court should
decide the question sooner rather than later. It could be that their
legal assessment is wrong, or that their assessment of the poten-
tial negative consequences flowing from the absence of pre-
enforcement review is wrong. But their view that the AIA,
properly applied, does not bar pre-enforcement challenges to
§ 5000A nevertheless coexists with their view that it would be
wise for Congress to make that clear through legislation.
Apart from the view that the AIA poses no obstacle to a pre-
enforcement challenge, another explanation for the apparent lack
of congressional concern about the AIA as an obstacle to a pre-
2015 determination of the constitutionality of § 5000A is that the
29. Michael C. Dorf & Neil S. Siegel, "Early-Bird Special" Indeed!: Why the Tax Anti-
Injunction Act Permits the Present Challenges to the Minimum Coverage Provision, 121
YALE L.J. ONLINE 389 (2012).
30. Id. at 410.
31. Id. at 399.
32. Id. at 410.
33. Id. at 411.
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parties to the litigation and their congressional allies believe that
the Supreme Court is essentially pragmatic. They couple this be-
lief with the view that the Justices would not incur the negative
consequences-not simply for the Court as an institution but also
for the country-that could follow from declining to decide. If
there are negative institutional consequences that would flow
from a decision not to decide, and the technical legal analysis
yields plausible arguments for deciding that the AIA is not a bar,
then perhaps the looming consequences could nudge at least a
majority into reaching that conclusion.
There may be something to this pragmatic assessment. But one
need not be naive about judicial behavior to reject this explana-
tion. As I explain below, there are also pragmatic reasons for the
Supreme Court to stay its hand-reasons that may be discounted
from an outside-the-Court perspective but that could be persua-
sive to at least some of the Justices.
Thinking about the potential influence of pragmatic considera-
tions on some of the Justices, however, naturally leads into think-
ing about the potential influence of pragmatic considerations
elsewhere. In my view, there are pragmatic considerations at
work in suppressing attention to the AIA as a potential obstacle
as the litigation heads into the Supreme Court. Arriving at a po-
sition on the AIA requires sustained legal analysis. But those in
the best position to engage in this analysis and to have their as-
sessment credited by the relevant decision makers also have the
least incentive to broadcast any resulting concerns that the AIA
bars pre-enforcement challenges to § 5000A. Lawyers for the par-
ties-both the federal government and the challengers-must
publicly profess that the AIA poses no bar. That is their litigating
position. And they understandably do not want to undercut it.
But it is impossible to avoid undercutting that litigating position,
at least somewhat, while pushing a legislative initiative premised
on the possibility that the position is wrong.
The desire of those in the know legally not to undercut their lit-
igating positions combines with the powerful force of political in-
ertia. Neither the law's challengers nor its defenders know
whether they will win or lose on the merits. But in a merits de-
termination about the constitutionality of § 5000A, there will be a
winning side and losing side. Because a jurisdictional loss is bet-
ter than a loss on the merits, perhaps both Republicans and
Democrats who worry privately about losing on the merits would
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prefer to leave open the possibility of a jurisdictional dismissal.
For Republicans and Democrats in Congress, who wants to facili-
tate a jurisdictional change that leads to a defeat on the merits?
We come, then, to a plausible explanation. Even though the
negative consequences of delayed review are significant, and the
legal question whose resolution will determine whether review
will be delayed is a close one, none of those most invested in the
issue have a strong enough incentive to make the case for a legis-
lative fix. For those who want a merits determination without re-
serving the possibility of a jurisdictional loss, however, the next
section sets forth one of the lead arguments establishing why it
would be wise for Congress to enact an exception to the AIA.
II. A SIMPLE ARGUMENT FOR THE AIA AS A BAR TO PRE-
ENFORCEMENT CHALLENGES TO § 5000A
The AIA creates a pay-first, litigate-later system for contesting
tax payments. It does this by prohibiting pre-enforcement suits
aimed at restraining the assessment or collection of taxes.34 The
statute provides that "no suit for the purpose of restraining the
assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any
court by any person."" With this prohibition, the AIA regulates
and regularizes the processes of assessment and collection.
Prior analyses of the AIA's applicability to the challenges
to § 5000A have begun with the AIA's text. These analyses have
focused primarily on whether the penalty imposed by § 5000A is a
"tax" within the meaning of § 7421." While there are good rea-
sons to believe that the answer to this question is "yes," most
lower court analyses that have addressed this question have con-
cluded that the answer is "no."" Having answered this question
34. See 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (2006).
35. Id.
36. See, e.g., Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d at 529 (6th Cir. 2011); Seven-
Sky Holder, 661 F.3d 1, at 5-14 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Florida ex rel. Bill McCollum v. U.S.
Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1130-31 (N.D. Fla. 2011).
37. See cases cited supra note 36. The only decision holding that § 5000A is a "tax"
within the meaning of the AIA is Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, - F. 3d -, _, 2011
WL 3962915, at *16 (4th Cir. 2011). Of the decisions holding that the AIA does not block a
pre-enforcement challenge to § 5000A, only the opinion for the D.C. Circuit analyzes in
depth the textual argument set forth in this section. See Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1,
6-14 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Judge Vinson addressed the argument as well, but only in passing
and unconvincingly. See Florida ex rel. Bill McCollum, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 1130-41.
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in the negative, these analyses conclude that the AIA does not
bar a pre-enforcement challenge to § 5000A-even one that seeks
to restrain the assessment or collection of the § 5000A penalty by
eliminating its legal basis."
Statutory text is the best place to start a quest for statutory
meaning. But by starting with the AIA's text alone, some prior
analyses have neglected the possibility that the AIA bars a pre-
enforcement suit to restrain the assessment or collection of the
§ 5000A penalty even if it is not a "tax." Such neglect is not be-
nign, for Congress has commanded that the § 5000A penalty
"shall be assessed and collected in the same manner" as a tax.
And this command cannot be complied with if pre-enforcement
challenges to the § 5000A penalty can be maintained in court.
The normal means of assessment and collection of taxes from
individuals is via individual tax returns.40 The timing of assess-
ment and collection is linked to the return, before any litigation.4
There are two provisions in the ACA that fold the assessment and
collection of the § 5000A penalty into the same process. The text
of these provisions provides an alternative starting point to an
analysis of whether pre-enforcement challenges to this § 5000A
penalty fall within the prohibition set forth in the AIA.
First, § 5000A(b)(2) requires that "[a]ny penalty imposed by
this section . .. shall be included with a taxpayer's return."42 Se-
cond, § 5000A(g)(1) sets forth a general rule that any penalty im-
posed by this section shall be assessed and collected in the same
manner as a tax.43 That is not what § 5000A(g)(1) says, in so
many words, but that is what it means when one carefully at-
tends to the text. The text says that the penalty "shall be as-
sessed and collected in the same manner as an assessable penalty
under subchapter B of chapter 68" of the Code." And in that part
of the Code, § 6671 says that such assessable penalties are to be
assessed and collected in the same manner as taxes.
38. See cases cited supra note 24.
39. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (Supp. TV 2010).
40. See id. § 6011(a) (2006).
41. Compare id., with id. § 7403(a) (2006).
42. Id. § 5000A(b)(2) (Supp. IV 2010).
43. Id. § 5000A(g)(1).
44. Id.
45. Id. § 6671(a).
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The basic argument for the AIA's applicability to the § 5000A
challenges is that pre-enforcement challenges to assessment and
collection of § 5000A penalties must be barred, just as pre-
enforcement challenges to assessment and collection of taxes are
barred, in order for § 5000A penalties to be assessed and collected
in the same manner as taxes. The AIA speaks directly to how
taxes are to be assessed and collected-without pre-enforcement
judicial interference. Codified at § 7421(a) of the Internal Reve-
nue Code, it states that "no suit for the purpose of restraining the
assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any
court by any person."" And § 5000A(g)(1), together with § 6671,
speaks directly to how § 5000A penalties are to be assessed and
collected-in the same manner as taxes.
Notice: This argument does not depend on the answer to the
question that dominated lower-court consideration of the AIA as a
bar-whether the § 5000A penalty is a "tax" within the meaning
of § 7421. What matters is that Congress has directed in
§ 5000 (g)(1) and § 6671 how § 5000A penalties are to be assessed
and collected-in the same manner as taxes.
The most persuasive rejoinder to this argument is the federal
government's, which is that § 5000A(g) does not speak to the
availability of pre-enforcement review.47 Instead, the provision
means only that the IRS should use the same methods and proce-
dures in assessing and collecting the § 5000A penalties as it uses
for taxes." In Judge Silberman's words, "[t]hese directions tell the
IRS how to calculate and obtain certain sums, not when to do
so"49so .
The problem with this response is that one cannot neatly sepa-
rate the "how" of assessment and collection from the "when" of
assessment and collection. The individual tax return is the typical
instrument for enabling the government's assessment and collec-
tion of individual taxes, and it is also the congressionally com-
manded instrument for enabling the federal government's as-
sessment and collection of individual penalties under § 5000A.50 If
46. Id. § 7421(a) (2006).
47. See Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d at 1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
48. See id.
49. Id.
50. See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b)(2) (Supp. IV 2010) (requiring inclusion of § 5000A penal-
ty with tax return); Id. § 6011(a) (2006) (requiring the filing of tax returns).
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the AIA does not bar pre-enforcement challenges to § 5000A, then
taxpayers can go to court rather than file any penalty due under
§ 5000A with their returns." On the tax collection side, the IRS
would not be able to collect the penalties until litigation has end-
ed, in contrast with its collection of taxes that-because of the
AIA-must be collected before judicial proceedings can be com-
menced. 2 Tax penalties that the IRS does not assess and collect
via an individual's tax return, but only by means of court-ordered
payment after litigation, are not "assessed and collected in the
same manner" as taxes.
Another problem with the how-not-when interpretation of
§ 5000A(g)(2) is the statutory language, which is set in the pas-
sive voice." The use of the passive voice reflects a generality of
reach about the congressional directive. As the Supreme Court
has observed, "[t]he passive voice focuses on an event that occurs
without respect to a specific actor. . . ."5 By using the passive
voice, Congress has commanded that a certain state of affairs
shall obtain-one in which § 5000A penalties are "assessed and
collected in the same manner" as taxes." It is incumbent not only
on the IRS, but also on the courts and individuals governed by
§ 5000A to cooperate in bringing about the state of affairs in
which this command is honored. That state of affairs is one in
which no court maintains a pre-enforcement challenge to the
§ 5000A penalty.
A third problem for the how-not-when interpretation is that
pre-enforcement litigation could preclude the § 5000A penalty
from ever being assessed or collected." Because of the AIA, even
illegal taxes are assessed and collected before they are required to
be refunded." That is a feature of a pay-first, litigate-later sys-
tem. To except the § 5000A penalties from the litigation prohibi-
tion in the AIA would create a litigate-first, pay-later system.
That system would be inconsistent with the statutory command
51. Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 32 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) ("[I]f the [AIA] did not ap-
ply, a tax could be assessed and collected only after the litigation was resolved in favor of
the IRS (if it was resolved in favor of the IRS), by means of a payment to the IRS in the
wake of a court order.").
52. Id.
53. See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(g)(1) (Supp. IV 2010).
54. Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568, -, 129 S. Ct. 1849, 1853 (2009).
55. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(g)(1); see id. § 6671(a) (2006).
56. See Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 33 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
57. 26 U.S.C. § 7422(a) (Supp. IV 2010).
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that § 5000A penalties "shall be assessed and collected in the
same manner" as taxes."
More can be said in support of the AIA's applicability.59 But the
point of the present analysis is not to be exhaustive. I have said
enough to draw a simple line from statutory premises in the Tax
Code to the interpretive conclusion that the AIA blocks pre-
enforcement challenges to § 5000A. Whether the Supreme Court
will reach the same conclusion is anyone's guess at this point. But
the arguments for this conclusion are sufficiently strong that
those who wish to avoid such a ruling should favor corrective leg-
islation to prevent the necessity for finding out the hard way how
the Supreme Court will rule.
Congress is responsible for both § 5000A and the AIA. If the
unavailability of a pre-enforcement challenge to § 5000A because
of the AIA is a problem, then, the problem is one that Congress
has made. And Congress is responsible for fixing it. Important
questions about details of legislative design must be addressed,
but crafting narrow legislation that would enable already existing
pre-enforcement challenges to be litigated to conclusion should
not present a difficult drafting problem. According to Steve John-
son, "[t]wo sentences of legislative language would suffice to de-
fuse the AIA issue.""
III. CONSEQUENCES AND CONCRETE REVIEW
Suppose that Congress does not enact an exception to the AIA.
What should the Supreme Court do? The simple answer, with
which nobody disagrees, is that the Court should determine
whether it has jurisdiction, should rule on the merits of the chal-
lenge if it does, and should decline to rule on the merits if it does
not.
58. Id. § 5000A(g)(1).
59. See generally Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, No. 10-2347, - F.3d _, 2011 WL
3962915 (4th Cir. Sept. 8, 2011); Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 21-54 (Kavanaugh, J., dissent-
ing). More can, of course, also be said on the opposite side as well. In addition to the anal-
yses of the Sixth and the D.C. Circuits, Michael Dorf and Neil Siegel have developed an
interpretation of the AIA that would, if correct, allow the present pre-enforcement chal-
lenges notwithstanding the argument presented above and the arguments developed by
Judge Motz and Judge Kavanaugh. See Dorf & Siegel, supra note 29, at 392.
60. Johnson, supra note 26, at 1402.
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It is a different question how far the Court should strain to
reach or to avoid a conclusion that the AIA bars pre-enforcement
challenges to § 5000A. Some Justices may weigh the consequenc-
es of delayed review more heavily than others." But all of them
should keep in mind that Congress and the President have not
found the prospect of delayed review sufficiently worrisome to act
to prevent it.
In light of the considerable uncertainty already generated by
the litigation, and the costs to the country of going forward under
a provision that may later be held unconstitutional, it may ap-
pear prudent to some Justices to read the AIA in a way that does
not bar the Court's authority to resolve the constitutionality
of § 5000A in the cases that have already made their way to the
Court. But it would not be wise to count on this. To the extent
that Justices do rely on consideration of consequences, the conse-
quences that matter most to them may differ from those that are
most salient from an external perspective. Two considerations
likely to be more salient from an inside-the-Court perspective are
the Justices' views about the desired shape of substantive consti-
tutional doctrine and their views about the role of the Supreme
Court more generally.
The Justices differ in their views about the optimal scope of
congressional power under the Commerce Clause and the power
to tax and spend. Whatever a particular Justice's views may be, a
decision about the constitutionality of § 5000A presents a risk ei-
ther of expansion or contraction of congressional power. Doctrine
enshrining such an expansion or contraction is more enduring
than the political forces presently pressing for prompt review. As
Judge Kavanaugh wrote in his dissenting opinion, "history and
precedent counsel caution before reaching out to decide difficult
constitutional questions too quickly, especially when the underly-
ing issues are of lasting significance."6 2 This inclination may be
felt with particular force by those directly responsible for the po-
tential doctrinal expansion or contraction.
61. See, e.g., Stephen G. Breyer, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE'S VIEW 73-
74 (2010) (including "consequences" on a list a of traditional tools of statutory interpreta-
tion).
62. Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 53 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
63. None of this is to deny the costs that constitutional avoidance can impose through
continued uncertainty, or to argue that the costs from uncertainty should be ignored. The-
se costs are obviously incommensurable with the costs of moving constitutional doctrine in
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Views about the Supreme Court's role as an institution present
a related blend of considerations. Justices on the Supreme Court
do not want the institution to be, or to be perceived as, weak.
They might worry such a perception could result from declining to
address an important constitutional issue based on a seeming
technicality. But Justices of the Supreme Court may also believe
that it is important not to privilege short-term, tangible conse-
quences over long-term, hard-to-measure consequences. And a
decision not to decide could strengthen the Supreme Court, in a
way, since its legitimacy derives in part from its identity as a
court of limited jurisdiction that resolves concrete cases.
The Justices on the Supreme Court should also recognize that
uncertainty about the constitutionality of § 5000A is just one
source of uncertainty surrounding the health care legislation.
While the litigants are pressing their cases in court, officeholders
and candidates for office have been taking their case to the peo-
ple. Nothing that the Court does can eliminate the uncertainty
generated by the 2012 election.
Regardless of how the Supreme Court ultimately answers the
question of whether the AIA bars pre-enforcement challenges
to § 5000A, the Court's need to ask the question provides a bene-
ficial corrective to the tendency to view the judicial role in cases
like these as divorced from the remedy-providing function of the
federal courts. In challenges like those that have been brought
against § 5000A, the lawsuit is not against the law but against its
enforcement. This is what makes the challenge a justiciable case:
someone claiming injury caused by its actual or threatened opera-
tion seeks judicial relief that would redress the injury. Whether
this sort of relief can be issued anticipatorily in circumstances
like those now facing the Supreme Court is a statutory question
insofar as the AIA is concerned. But there would be a constitu-
tional problem if the request for a constitutional ruling were un-
coupled from the request for a judicial remedy.6 And adjudicating
one way or another. The point of the present discussion is to observe that the pragmatic
calculus about costs and benefits of a merits determination made sooner rather than later
(or perhaps never if § 5000A is repealed or modified) looks different from inside the Su-
preme Court than from outside.
64. See, e.g., DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 (2006) ("A plaintiff
must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct
and likely to be redressed by the requested relief." (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,
751 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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a lawsuit against the mandate itself, considered apart from its
enforcement through the penalty, would involve such an uncou-
pling.
The job of a federal court in a case like the present challenges
to § 5000A is not to decide about the validity of law considered in
itself, but to decide on the obligations of persons under law. In an
attempt to avoid the AIA's application, however, the challengers
have argued that they are not challenging the tax penalty itself,
only the underlying requirement to possess insurance." According
to the National Federation of Independent Business ("NFIB"), the
purpose of the lawsuit is not to restrain the government's en-
forcement by means of a tax penalty, but rather "to 'restrain' the
mandate's free-standing legal requirement that they must buy
costly insurance .. .. Petitioners' 'purpose' here obviously has
nothing to do with 'restraining' the sanction for non-compliance
with the mandate ....
As an initial matter, this characterization of the NFIB's chal-
lenge to § 5000A is inaccurate. The characterization appears in a
petition for a writ of certiorari in which the question presented is
"whether the ACA must be invalidated in its entirety because it is
nonseverable from the individual mandate that exceeds Con-
gress's limited and enumerated powers under the Constitution.""
The challengers cannot have it both ways. They are in fact, seek-
ing for the ACA to be "invalidated in its entirety."" They are not
seeking a declaration of unconstitutionality with no consequences
for the enforcement of the § 5000A penalty.
Moreover, the challengers' AIA-avoiding, ACA-destroying posi-
tion on severability is exactly backwards. Section 5000A is an in-
tegrated whole, while the ACA contains a mish-mash of parts,
some of which are as unrelated as requiring individuals to have
insurance and requiring employers to accommodate breastfeeding
65. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 18, Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius,
No. 11-393 (U.S. Sept. 28, 2011) (asserting that the purpose of the suit is not to restrain
the so-called tax but only the mandate's free-standing legal requirement that they must
buy costly insurance).
66. Id. (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (2006)).
67. Id. at i.
68. Id.; see also id. at 19 (stating that the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals incorrect-
ly severed the mandate from the rest of the ACA and finding that the ACA could not sur-
vive without the mandate).
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employees." A federal court ruling about the constitutionality
of § 5000A need not imply anything about the continued enforce-
ability of other parts of the ACA." But there is no way to slice up
§ 5000A itself to result in a ruling on the constitutionality of the
insurance requirement that has no necessary implications for the
continued enforceability of the tax penalty.
One can appreciate the interweaving of various subsections of
§ 5000A by beginning with the question of which subsection con-
tains the challenged insurance requirement. As it turns out, no
single subsection fits the bill. Rather, the requirement is spread
across multiple subsections. Subsection 5000A(a) states that each
"applicable individual shall .. . ensure that the individual ... is
covered under minimum essential coverage."" But subsection (a)
does not define either "applicable individual" or "minimum essen-
tial coverage." Subsection (d) defines "applicable individual," and
subsection (f) defines "minimum essential coverage."72 The tax
penalty provisions are located in subsections (b), (c), (e), and (g)."
And those provisions cannot be understood apart from subsec-
tions (a), (d), and (f)." For example, consider subsection (b)(1),
which explicitly cross-references subsections (a) and (e) (as well
as (c)): "If . .. an applicable individual . .. fails to meet the re-
quirement of subsection (a) for 1 or more months, [during any
calendar year beginning after 2013,] then, except as provided in
subsection (e), there is hereby imposed . . . a penalty with respect
to such failures in the amount determined under subsection (c).""
Subsection (e), which sets forth categories of those exempt from
paying the penalty, begins by stating: "No penalty shall be im-
posed under subsection (a)."" Subsection (a), of course, is the pro-
vision that the challengers view as somehow separable from the
penalty." Yet, Congress described the penalty as one "imposed
69. Compare 26 U.S.C. § 500OA (Supp. IV 2010), with 29 U.S.C. § 207 (Supp. IV 2010).
70. Indeed, the very fact that standard formulations of severability doctrine appear to
underwrite judicial power to "invalidate" this legislation in its entirety suggests that there
is something deeply wrong with that doctrine. See generally Kevin C. Walsh, Partial Un-
constitutionality, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 738 (2010).
71. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a) (Supp. IV 2010).
72. Id. § 5000A(d), (f).
73. Id. § 5000A(b), (c), (e), (g).
74. See id. § 5000A(a), (d), (f).
75. Id. § 5000A(b)(1).
76. Id. § 5000A(e).
77. Id. § 5000A(a); see Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 65.
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under subsection (a)."" Additionally, subsection (g)(1) describes
the penalty as "provided by this section," that is, the entire
§ 5000A."
Apart from the fact that § 5000A is an integrated whole, there
is another reason that the requirement to have insurance cannot
be challenged in federal court apart from the penalty that enforc-
es it. Federal courts do not sit to decide abstract questions of law,
but cases and controversies involving concrete actual or threat-
ened injury. There would be no Article III case or controversy in
the absence of threatened enforcement or some other negative le-
gal consequence arising out of failure to comply with § 5000A. In
the absence of a penalty or some other negative legal conse-
quence, the requirement to maintain minimum essential coverage
would not threaten any injury that a federal court could remedy.
More fundamentally, there would be no proper defendant for an
action to challenge the constitutionality of a legal provision that
could not be enforced in some way.
The Supreme Court cannot, and should not, take up the consti-
tutionality of § 5000A's insurance requirement without regard to
its potential enforcement through the section's accompanying tax
penalty. Whatever the Court ultimately decides about the ap-
plicability of the AIA, one can hope that the Court's method of
reasoning rests on a properly judicial understanding of the power
that it is exercising with respect to § 5000A.
CONCLUSION
Congress's inaction in the face of a serious obstacle to obtaining
a ruling on the constitutionality of § 5000A appears attributable
78. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(e) (Supp. IV 2010).
79. Id. § 5000A(g)(1). The fact that § 5000A is an integrated whole not only provides a
stand-alone reason why the insurance requirement cannot be challenged apart from the
penalty; it also shows why the D.C. Circuit was wrong to accept such an uncoupling, even
under that court's too narrow interpretation of Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725
(1974), and Alexander v. "Americans United" Inc., 416 U.S. 752 (1974). In responding to
Judge Kavanaugh's claim that these decisions foreclosed plaintiffs attempt to avoid the
AIA through characterizing their challenge as one to the insurance requirement apart
from the penalty, the majority opinion states that Bob Jones and "Americans United" came
out as they did only because the challenges there were "inextricably linked to the assess-
ment and collection of taxes." See Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
Contrary to Judge Silberman's description of § 5000A and the plaintiffs challenge, Seven-
Sky simply is not a case in which the plaintiffs challenge a "discrete regulatory require-
ment" apart from a tax imposed by Congress "in a separate provision." Id.
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to a combination of inertia and strategic calculation about the
costs and benefits of altering an uncertain status quo. Uncertain-
ty about how the Supreme Court will rule on the merits of the
constitutional challenge contributes to the maintenance of a sta-
tus quo that holds the possibility of a jurisdictional loss for both
challengers and defenders of the law. Such a jurisdictional loss
would individually be better for both than a loss on the merits,
but worse for both than a win on the merits. The costs to delayed
review are sufficient to justify Congress in acting to avoid it. But
if Congress and the Administration do not act, then neither
should the Court strain one way or the other in deciding whether
the AIA bars the present pre-enforcement challenges.
